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In this article, it will be argued that one of the key contributions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) to
goal-directed action selection lies both in retrieving the value of goals that are the putative outcomes of the decision
process and in establishing a relative preference ranking for these goals by taking into account the value of each of the
different goals under consideration in a given decision-making scenario. These goal-value signals are then suggested
to be used as an input into the on-line computation of action valuesmediated by brain regions outside of the vmPFC,
such as parts of the parietal cortex, supplementary motor cortex, and dorsal striatum. Collectively, these areas can
be considered to be constituent elements of a multistage decision process whereby the values of different goals must
first be represented and ranked before the value of different courses of action available for the pursuit of those goals
can be computed.
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Introduction
Imagine you are faced with the challenge of obtain-
ing lunch and that, in your town, there are three
restaurants: one offers Chinese food, another offers
Italian food, and the third offers French food. Solv-
ing this problem requires several sequential compu-
tations. The first of these involves encoding a value
for each of the possible goal states (in this case, the
prospect of eating lunch in eachof these restaurants)
and of computing a relative preference ranking for
these outcomes. Once determined, the next step in
the process is to work out what actions to take to at-
tain each of the different goals, taking into account
the probability that those actions will be successful
in attaining the goal, and the amount of effort re-
quired to complete them: for example, should you
walk or drive? how far is it to each restaurant, and
what are the chances of being stuck in traffic? Finally,
one must compare and contrast between the differ-
ent available decision options integrating across the
value of each goal and the action contingencies and
costs required to obtain each goal. In this article, it
will be argued that the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (vmPFC) is part of a network of brain areas that
in concert with other brain regions enables a solu-
tion to this type of decision problem. The vmPFC
as defined here refers to the medial orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC; area 11 and 14) and adjacent ventral
medial cortex (part of area 10); it does not include
the central (area 13) or lateral orbitofrontal cor-
tices (areas 12/47). It will be proposed that one of
the main functions for the vmPFC in this decision-
making process is the encoding and retrieval of the
value of available goal states, taking into account
the current motivational state of the organism, and
in computing the relative or comparative value of
these goals within a given decision context. Such
goal values can be retrieved by associative links be-
tween particular actions and associated outcomes
or can be retrieved by discriminative stimuli that
signal the availability of individual outcomes. The
contribution of vmPFC to the decision process can
be contrastedwith that of other areas such as the an-
terior dorsal striatum, supplementarymotor cortex,
and lateral intraparietal (LIP) sulcus, which instead
contribute toward the process of assigning values
to actions available to pursue particular goal states.
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Together, these brain areas can be viewed as partici-
pating nodes in a multicomponent decision process
for goal-directed behavior, enabling relative prefer-
ences to be calculated over available goals in one
part of the system and for an action or set of ac-
tions to be selected to pursue those goals in another
part.
The role of vmPFC in representing goal
values
There is evidence to suggest that vmPFC is involved
in representing the value of goal states at several
stages in the decision process. First, this area is in-
volved in encoding the value of goals as they are
actually attained and experienced. Second, there is
some emerging evidence to suggest that this region
may be involved in encoding the relative values of
different available goals, which could yield a prefer-
ence ranking over goal states. Finally, this region is
involved in encoding the value of chosen options.
We will now describe each of these signals in turn.
Value signals for experienced goals (outcome
values)
There is now considerable evidence to suggest that
vmPFC (particularly the medial orbital surface) is
involved in encoding the value of outcomes as they
are attained and experienced by an animal. Such
signals were first reported in neurophysiological
recording studies from the OFC of nonhuman pri-
mates, where OFC neurons were found to respond
to the taste or odor of foods presented to themonkey
with the additional property that such neurons ex-
hibited decreased responding when the animal was
satiated compared to when it was hungry, suggest-
ing that those neuronsweremodulated as a function
of the motivational significance of the stimuli to the
animal.1,2 Similar findings have been obtained in
humans for odor and gustatory stimuli. O’Doherty
et al.3 scanned hungry human participants while
they were presented with two food-related odors.
Subjects were subsequently removed from the scan-
ner, fed one of the corresponding foods to satiety
so that the pleasantness of that food and its associ-
ated odor decreased relative to the pleasantness of
the food not eaten, and then placed back into the
scanner. Activity was found in the OFC in response
to both food odors, and moreover, responses to the
odor of the food eaten appeared to show a selective
decrease after feeding relative to the odor of the food
not eaten. These results, therefore, suggest a role for
human OFC in encoding the reward value of the
odor stimuli. Other studies have reported correla-
tions between subjective reports of odor pleasant-
ness for a variety of different odors and activity in
human OFC.4,5 Small et al.6 also found differential
activity in the OFC in response to gustatory stimuli
of different subjective value while7 reporting mod-
ulation in this region as a function of changes in
pleasantness for the taste of water in thirsty sub-
jects who were subsequently sated. Similar differ-
ential responses in the OFC have been reported
for somatosensory stimuli.8 Blood et al.9 presented
musical sequences while varying the degree of har-
monization between the tones within a sequence,
thereby eliciting increased levels of perceived pleas-
antness as harmonization was increased. Activity in
themedialOFC in response to themusical toneswas
found to increase the more pleasant the sequence
from what it was reported to be, implicating this re-
gion in encoding the hedonic value of stimuli in the
auditory domain. This region has also been found to
contribute to hedonic evaluation for visual stimuli:
O’Doherty et al.10 scanned subjects with functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while present-
ing face stimuli that varied in physical attractive-
ness. A significant correlation was found between
the degree of rated attractiveness and the level of ac-
tivity in the medial OFC (see also Refs. 11 and 12).
Similar results have been found in OFC for visual
stimuli other than attractive faces, such as pictorial
scenes.13 Further evidence of a role for this area in
outcome value coding has come from a number of
studies reporting activity in the OFC to abstract re-
wards not tied to a particular sensorymodality such
as receiving monetary gains14,15 or social praise or
feedback.16 Collectively, these findings implicate the
OFC, particularly its medial aspects, in representing
the positive hedonic value of outcomes. It is impor-
tant to emphasize that outcome value representa-
tions in the OFC are not invariant. Not only can
such representations be modulated as a function of
changes in internal motivation state as mentioned
earlier, but value-related activity in this region can
also be influenced by cognitive factors such as the
provision of price information17 or merely the use
of semantic information or even brand labels.18,19
Thus, the on-line computation of outcome value in
the OFC is highly flexible and can be directly influ-
enced by a variety of internal and external factors.
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Evidence for prechoice goal-value signals
We will next consider signals that are present at
the time of decision making pertaining to the value
of available goals. Returning to our food example,
if making a decision between Chinese, Italian, or
French cuisine, the value of each of those foods will
need to be separately encoded so that they can be
entered into the decision process. Thus, to find evi-
dence for prechoice signals representing goal values,
we would need to find evidence for unique and sep-
arable signals pertaining to the value of each avail-
able goal option in a given decision-making context.
In a single-unit recording study by Camillo Pado-
Schioppa and Assad,20 at the time of decision mak-
ing, separate yet spatially intermingled populations
of neurons in the central OFC were found to be
correlated with the value of each of the particular
decision options or “goods” available to themonkey
on that trial. Given these findings and the likelihood
that in humans neurons encoding individual goals
are likely also to be spatially intermingled, it is es-
pecially challenging to obtain evidence supporting
the existence of such signals with the spatial res-
olution available in human neuroimaging studies.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence suggestive of
the existence of such signals within vmPFC. If dis-
tinct populations of neurons in a particular brain
area are involved in encoding the value of individ-
ual available goals, then at the level of the BOLD
(blood oxygen level–dependent) fMRI signal, such
a regionwould elicit a signal approximating the sum
of those individual goal values under the assump-
tion that these signals aggregate in an approximately
linear fashion. Thus, a candidate area for encoding
individual prechoice goal values would be an area
correlating with the sum of the values of available
outcomes. Wunderlich et al.21 reported just such an
area in an anterior part of the vmPFC above the or-
bital surface; this area correlated with the sum of the
values for the decision options presented on a given
trial as denoted by discriminative stimuli. However,
it should be noted that finding such an area rep-
resenting the sum of values is not an unequivocal
demonstration of individual goal-value signals, as
naturally this area could simply encode the sum
of values per se instead of the overlapping values
of individual goals. A better approach to address
this question in future would be to use multivariate
analysis techniques to detect distributed patterns of
voxel activity unique to individual goal states or al-
ternatively to temporally separate the presentation
of goal options at a level discriminable by the BOLD
signal. Furthermore, if goal values are encoded on a
relative scale (see the next section), then such signals
would not be detectable as variation in the average
across trials because by definition the average activ-
ity would always be the same on each trial (because
of scaling).
Other evidence consistent with the existence of
goal values in vmPFC was provided in a series of
studies using a “willingness to pay” paradigm by
Plassmann et al.22,23 In this paradigm, hungry hu-
mansubjects are scannedwhilebeingpresentedwith
pictures denoting a variety of foodstuffs while in-
dicating their “willingness-to-pay” (WTP) for each
of the food items, out of an initial endowment of
four dollars available for each item. After the ex-
periment was over, one of the trials is selected at
random and if the reported WTP exceeds a ran-
dom draw from a lottery then subjects are provided
with the good and invited to consume it (and their
endowment is drawn on); otherwise, they keep the
endowment and do not receive the good. This pro-
cedure is designed to ensure that the subjects give
their true underlying valuation for each of the items.
In several studies, activity in a region of vmPFC was
found to be correlated with trial-by-trial variations
inWTP, suggesting a role for this region in encoding
the goal-value of the potential outcomes. A follow-
up study used a similar procedure to measure goal-
value responses to a variety of different classes of
goods, including monetary gambles, trinkets, and
food items. An overlapping region of vmPFC (just
above the orbital surface) was found to be correlated
with the value of all three classes of items, suggesting
that goal-value coding for many different categories
of goods may all converge within the same region of
vmPFC. Such a regionwould, therefore, be an excel-
lent candidate for mediating coding of the utilities
assigned to diverse types of goal stimuli.24
vmPFC computes the relative value
of available goals
There is also now emerging evidence that this region
may contribute to generating a preference ranking
over available goals. In a neurophysiology study by
Tremblay and Schultz,25 recording from a part of
central OFC, neurons were found to exhibit a rel-
ative value code, responding more for a stimulus
indicating the subsequent delivery of a particular
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juice reward if that juice was the most preferred
juice over the set of available juice stimuli in a block
of trials, whereas responding less to the same stim-
ulus predicting the same juice when presented in
blocks of trials where that juice was the least pre-
ferred outcome (but see also Ref. 26 that reported
a population of OFC neurons that did not exhibit
such relative preference coding). In an fMRI study,27
stimuli were presented that predicted the delivery of
a subsequent monetary reward. Neural responses in
vmPFC to a stimulus that predicted a specific mon-
etary amount were different depending on whether
that stimulus was presented in a context where the
monetary amount was the maximum available re-
ward over a block of trials when compared to a
context where the same monetary amount was the
smallest amount available over a block of trials. A
recent study by Lim et al.28 also showed evidence for
a relative value code in this region but, in addition,
suggested that visual attentionmightmodulate such
a signal. Participants viewed two food stimuli over
which they had to render a choice. However, on each
trial they were asked to attend specifically to one of
the two food-items by means of a visual fixation.
Activity in vmPFC was found to correlate with the
subjective value of the attended item relative to the
value of the unattended item, providing further ev-
idence that this region is involved in computing a
relative value code. Moreover, these findings sug-
gest that visual attentionmight be a device by which
certain goals are highlighted over others within this
structure during the evolving temporal dynamics of
the decision process.
Value of chosen options
Another signal present in the vmPFC is the chosen
value, which corresponds to the expected value of
the decision option that is ultimately selected. Cho-
sen values are in common with outcome values, a
postdecision selection signal, in that they are a con-
sequence as opposed to a precursor or input into the
decision process. A number of studies have revealed
these signals to be present while human subjects
perform simple choice tasks.21,29–32 Furthermore,
such signals have also been reported in the activity
of single neurons within the monkey OFC.20
Given that the chosen-value signals arepostchoice
signals and are thus not likely to play a causal role in
the decision process itself, what could their function
be?One possibility is that these signals could be used
alongside the value of the experienced outcomes to
generate prediction error signals by comparing the
value of the experienced outcome with the expected
value of the chosen option. Such prediction errors
have been found to be carried by the phasic activ-
ity of dopamine neurons and they have been found
in a number of areas in human fMRI studies, most
prominently in the striatum. The most widely hy-
pothesized function for such signals is to underpin
learning andupdating of stimulus- and action-value
signals in the striatum and perhaps elsewhere. How-
ever, the extent to which such reward prediction
error signals would be required within the goal-
directed system (as opposed to systems involved in
habitual and Pavlovian learning; see the section on
multiple systems given later) is controversial, partic-
ularly within the context of computational theories
of goal-directed learning that use “model-based”
forwardplanning.33Within such a framework, value
computations for actions are computed on-line and
thus do not require a reward prediction error for
trial and error learning (although other kinds of
prediction errors may contribute to learning other
features such as the state-space; see Ref. 34). How-
ever, a signal reporting the degree of discrepancy be-
tween one’s predictions and actual experience could
also serve other functions even within a model-
based system, such as by acting as a “model-based”
critic indicating how well one’s goal-directed ac-
tion system is performing—large prediction errors
within this systemmight serve an alerting function,
in essence acting as a wake up call suggesting the
need to urgently reevaluate the system’s predictions.
In addition, such a signal might directly influence
behavior: a large positive prediction error would in-
dicate that the system should focus on selecting the
immediately preceding action, whereas a large neg-
ative prediction error would indicate the need to try
something else.
Value signals in vmPFC: retrieved
by actions or stimuli?
The finding of goal-value signals in the vmPFC
raises the question as towhat associativemechanism
underlies the retrieval of such signals. Under situ-
ations where different actions are associated with
different possible goal states, one way in which the
value of the goal state could be retrieved is through
learnedaction–outcomeassociations: consideration
of the actionwould therefore result in the associative
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retrieval of the value of the attendant goal outcome.
Yet another mechanism by which goal values could
be retrieved is through associations formed between
discriminative stimuli that indicate the availabil-
ity of particular decision options or goals and the
identity of the goal outcomes. In a typical decision-
making task, both possible associative mechanisms
are available in which participants usually need to
select from several physical actions tomake a choice;
furthermore, these decision options are usually sig-
naled by means of discriminative stimuli (e.g., dif-
ferent fractal patterns, different slot machines, or
different colors). Todiscriminate between thesepos-
sibilities, Glascher et al.29 compared and contrasted
the neural representation of goal-value signals in
vmPFC in one of the two decision-making tasks.
In one stimulus-based task, the available decision
options were signaled by means of two discrimina-
tive stimuli (fractals), which in turn were associated
with performance of particular actions to obtain
those outcomes. In contrast, in an action-based task,
no unique discriminative stimulus was presented to
indicate specific actions; instead participants had
to render choices over two unique actions (rotat-
ing a tracker ball vs. pressing a button). In both
cases, an overlapping region of vmPFC was found
to be correlatedwith the value of the decision option
that was ultimately chosen. These findings suggest
that the value of the underlying outcomes could be
retrieved by associations learned through pairings
with different physical actions, and that such goal-
value signals, therefore, are not necessarily elicited
exclusively by means of discriminative stimuli.
Further evidence that chosen-value representa-
tions can be elicited by specific actions came from
Wunderlich et al.32 This study also involved an
action-based choice task, except in this case on each
trial subjects needed to choose between two differ-
ent physical actionmodalities: making an eyemove-
ment (a saccade from a central fixation point to a
target in the right of the visual field) versus mak-
ing a handmovement (using a right-handed button
press). The probability of winning on each action
was varied over time using a randomwalk, and sub-
jects had to keep sampling the two actions to work
out which movement was generating the greatest
probability of reward so that this movement could
be exploiteduntil such time as the contingencies had
changed again. Once again,Wunderlich et al., found
signals correlating with the value of the chosen ac-
tion in vmPFC, again consistent with the suggestion
that these signals couldbedrivenby action represen-
tations as opposed to purely being stimulus-bound.
However, evenmore critically,Wunderlich et al. ob-
served a topographical arrangement of choice val-
ues within vmPFC with regard to the specific action
modality that was chosen: whereas an anterior re-
gion of vmPFC was correlated with choice values
irrespective of whether the action chosen was an
eye or a hand movement, a midregion of vmPFC
was correlated with choice values only when a hand
movementwas selected, and amoreposterior region
again correlatedwith choice values onlywhen an eye
movement was selected. Such an action-dependent
topography could not easily be explained by means
of an associative retrieval of goal values depending
solely on discriminative stimuli.
These findings raise the question of whether goal-
value representations in the vmPFC are necessarily
elicited only by action-dependent associations or
whether such representations can be elicited purely
by discriminative stimuli. To address this question,
Wunderlich et al.21 used a task in which the pre-
sentation of stimuli depicting the available decision
options was temporally separated from the time at
which specific actions could be selected to make
a choice. At the beginning of a trial, the subject
was presented with a choice between two of three
possible stimuli, each of which was associated with
distinct drifting probabilities of obtaining reward.
After a delay, subjects were subsequently presented
with additional symbols informing them whether a
given stimulus could be selected by performing an
eye movement or else a hand movement. Critically,
subjects were not informed at the time when the
choice stimuli were presented what particular ac-
tion was needed to select a particular stimulus; the
stimulus–actionmappingswere onlymade available
subsequently. Thus, subjects could potentially make
a choice over stimuli before they could select partic-
ular actions to implement that choice. Once again,
Wunderlich et al.used a computationalmodel to de-
rive trial-by-trial predictions for the chosen-value
signal and tested for the presence of this signal at
two different time points in the trial: first, when
the choice stimuli were initially presented, and sec-
ond, once the actions required to implement the
choice were made available immediately before an
action was performed. Remarkably, at the time of
stimulus presentation, a robust chosen-value signal
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was observed, whereas at the time that the actions
were made available, no such signal was found.
These findings first of all demonstrate that at least,
in some circumstances, choices can be made over
stimuli even before the specific actions needed to
implement that choice are made available; however,
the findings also show that chosen-value signals can
be computed even in the absence of specific actions,
suggesting that chosen-value signals in vmPFCneed
not necessarily be elicited by actions but can be
elicited by discriminative stimuli as well.
Action values outside of the vmPFC
An action-value signal codes for the value of the
expected outcome when taking that particular ac-
tion in a particular context. For instance, in the
restaurant example, if the goal being considered is
to obtain Chinese food and the Chinese restaurant
is located a few blocks to the south, then taking the
action of walking south will have higher value than
taking the action of walking north. Unlike chosen
values, which as we have seen can also be retrieved
by specific actions but are postchoice signals, the ac-
tion values considered here are prechoice signals. In
a decision-making scenario whereby several possi-
ble actions can be selected to attain a particular goal,
if each possible action is assigned an action value,
it is possible to compare these action values to de-
termine which action to select to attain that goal.
What evidence exists for the presence of action val-
ues in the brain?Within the vmPFC, although some
neurophysiology studies have reported neuronal ac-
tivity related to particular actions35 and, as we have
described earlier, there is evidence that chosen-value
signals in this region can be elicited by specific ac-
tions and/or action modalities, there is arguably no
direct evidence as of yet for the existence of pure
action-value signals in this area. However, in other
parts of the brain there is now emerging evidence
suggesting the presence of such signals. Samejima
et al.,36 recorded from the striatum while monkeys
performed a simple choice task in which they could
choose between one of four possible actions asso-
ciated with different amounts of reinforcement in
different stimulus conditions. By correlating neu-
ral signals against action values generated from a
reinforcement-learning (RL) model, they reported
that some neurons appeared to uniquely code for
the value of individual actions (as opposed to the
value of the action ultimately chosen). Lau and
Glimcher37 also reported action-value signals in the
striatum using a similar monkey choice paradigm.
Many other neurophysiology studies have reported
action-dependent value signals in striatum and in
areas of the cortex such as LIP sulcus or supple-
mentary motor cortex.38–40 However, with respect
to LIP, these signals appear not to be pure action-
value signals in that they are modulated as a func-
tion of what action is ultimately chosen. In humans,
the Wunderlich et al.’s32 study referred to earlier at-
tempted to identify the existence of action values
in the brain above and beyond chosen values. Re-
call that the paradigm involved required subjects to
make a choice between an eyemovement and a hand
movement, whereby the probability of obtaining a
reward after choice of these actions changed over
the course of the experiment. The reason in that ex-
periment for requiring choices to be made between
effector modalities as opposed to between individ-
ual motor movements within a modality was that
whereas it might be expected that neurons coding
for action values within amodality would be located
within the same overlapping area of cortex and/or
striatum and thus be difficult to separate with fMRI,
action values for between modality effectors might
be expected to be represented in spatially distinct
brain areas thus enabling their identification with
fMRI. To identify action values for eye movements,
it was possible to look for areas correlating with the
RL-derived valueof the eyemovement,with thepro-
viso that such value signals are invariant irrespective
of whether the eye movement is chosen. Similarly,
to identify action values for handmovements, it was
possible to look for areas showing correlations with
the value of handmovement irrespective of whether
that movement was chosen on a given trial. Activity
in a region of the presupplementary eye fields in
the medial frontal cortex was found to be correlated
with action values for eye movements, whereas a
nearby region of supplementary motor cortex was
found to be correlated with action values for hand
movements. These findings suggest that it is indeed
possible to detect prechoice action-value signals in
the human brain and that these signals can be found
in supplementarymotor areas.Given the single-unit
neurophysiology findings described earlier, it is also
likely that such signals are present elsewhere in the
human brain such as the dorsal striatum, although
in those other areas, if such signals are intermixed
at the neuronal population level, conventional
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univariate fMRI analyses may not have permitted
their identification.
The computation of goal-directed action
values: goal values, action contingency,
and action costs
Let’s consider precisely, in brief, how an action value
is constructed. One component of an action value is
the signal we’ve considered already: the relative
value of the goal outcome. However, alongside goal
values, another critical signal necessary for the com-
putation of action values is the probability with
which one can expect to obtain the outcome when a
particular action is performed. Tanaka et al.41 con-
ducted a study to investigate neural systems involved
in encoding action probabilities. These authors fo-
cused specifically on the probability of an outcome
given an action and found that activity within the
vmPFC and anterior dorsal striatum correlatedwith
the level of correlation between actions and out-
comes, consistent with other evidence these regions
are involved in encoding the expected value of cho-
sen actions as reviewed earlier. However, to estab-
lish the value of an action it is necessary not only to
compute the probability of obtaining an outcome
given that action was performed, but also to take
into account the probability of obtaining that out-
come if the action is not performed. Contingency
is the term used in animal learning to describe the
combination of these two variables: it is the proba-
bility of obtaining a particular outcome given that
an action is performed relative to the probability of
obtaining that outcome given that the action is not
performed. Thus, an action can be associated with
a high probability of an outcome occurring if that
action is initiated (so that it is highly contiguous),
yet this action would be very low in contingency if
the probability of obtaining the sameoutcomewhen
the action is not performed is equally high. In other
words, if youget theoutcome irrespectiveofwhether
you perform the action or not, contingency would
be very low, whereas if you get the reward only if you
perform the action, the action contingency would
be high. Liljeholm et al.42 examined the neural cor-
relates of action contingency. Athough vmPFC was
still found to be correlated with the probability of
reward given an action was performed, this region
did not show evidence for encoding of the proba-
bility of obtaining an outcome if that action is not
performed. Instead, integration of these different
action probabilities was found elsewhere within the
inferior parietal lobule and medial frontal gyrus. It
is of interest that similar regions to that found to
encode contingency have recently been implicated
in encoding a “state” prediction error, which could
underpin learning of a model of the state-space
of a decision problem, in particular of the transi-
tion probabilities between states contingent on the
performance of particular actions.34 The computa-
tion of action contingency could be mediated by
a tree search over state–action pairs within such a
model-based state-space representation, in which
the probability of obtaining a particular outcome
given the performance of a sequence of actions is
calculated.
In addition to action contingency, another vari-
able of relevance when computing an action value
is the cost or effort associated with that action. Nat-
urally, some actions are more effortful than others,
and the degree of effort involved in performing a
particular action needs to be integrated along with
contingency to compute an overall action value and,
therefore, to establish whether that particular action
should be favored over alternatives. Although little
is currently understood about where action effort or
costs are encoded, preliminary evidence suggests a
role for the anterior cingulate and insular cortex.43
Taken together, this evidence is consistent with the
suggestion that the integration of effort costs and
contingency to compute action values takes place
outside of the vmPFC.
The relationship of the goal-directed
system to other systems for behavioral
control
In this article, we have focused on the contributions
of the vmPFC to goal-directed behavior, by which
we mean the selection of actions (A) in a given con-
text (S) to obtain a goal outcome (O). It is, of course,
well established that there are at least two other sys-
tems involved in controllingbehavior: ahabit system
and a Pavlovian system.44–47 In contrast to the goal-
directed system, the habit system is concerned with
selecting actions on the basis of learned stimulus–
response (S–R) associations without any consider-
ation of the incentive value of an outcome or goal
state. On the other hand, the Pavlovian system is
concerned with eliciting conditioned responses (es-
sentially reflexive skeletomotor behaviors as well
as autonomic and other physiological changes) in
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response to learned associations between stimuli
and behaviorally significant outcomes such as re-
wards or punishers (see Ref. 45 for a detailed dis-
cussion of these different systems). Because each of
these different learning systems will often be en-
gaged at the same time during a particular decision-
making task, it can be very challenging to work out
which of these associative learning systems are con-
trolling behavior during task performance, and to
ascertain which of the underlying associations ac-
count for observed neural activity.
How can these contributions be differentiated?
The classical behavioral assay for discriminating
goal-directed from habitual behavior is to devalue
the outcome with which a particular action is as-
sociated (by, e.g., feeding the subject to satiety on
that action). If behavior is controlled by the goal-
directed system, responding will decrease on that
action, whereas conversely if behavior is driven by
stimulus–response associations, responding will re-
main unchanged after devaluation.48 Similarly in
the brain, reward-related neural activity pertain-
ing to S–R habits can be differentiated from goal-
directed processing by testing for changes in activity
at the time of action selection: if activity decreases
after devaluation, this implicates the region in goal-
directed control; if not, then this could impli-
cate the region in S–R habits. With respect to the
vmPFC, precisely this manipulation has been done
by Valentin et al., and it has been found that this
region follows the response profile consistent with a
role for this region in goal-directed but not habitual
processing.49
However, this still leaves us with a competing
Pavlovian account for the vmPFC activity. Evidence
inconsistent with a Pavlovian explanation for goal-
value signals in the vmPFC itself comes from one
of the WTP paradigms described previously.23 In
that study, in addition to the free-choice condition
during which participants had to actively select a
WTP for each item, participants also took part in
a “forced-choice” condition during which the com-
puter program selected a WTP that they were then
forced to select. In this condition, no significant ac-
tivity was observed in the vmPFC correlating with
the goal value of the item and this region was signif-
icantly less active in the forced-choice compared to
the free-choice condition. This result is incompati-
ble with a Pavlovian account, because if activity in
response to the goal outcomes did reflect a purely
Pavlovian value, one would expect to find this sig-
nal to be present in the forced condition as much
as in the free-choice condition (as Pavlovian effects
will be present irrespective of choice). Further evi-
dence incompatible with the Pavlovian explanation
comes from the study by Glascher et al.29 described
earlier, in which strong value-related activity was
found in the vmPFC during performance of the
choice task, even when those actions were selected
in the absence of discriminative stimuli (such that
a Pavlovian association is unlikely to be elicited).
Finally, De Witt et al.50 performed an fMRI study
in which they conducted an instrumental outcome
devaluation procedure similar to that described in
Valentin et al., but where the devaluation was per-
formed in the absence of discriminative stimuli that
could guide performance. As in the Valentin et al.
study, the vmPFC was found to track the value of
the associated outcome. Taken together, therefore,
these results suggest that the vmPFC is most likely
to be involved in goal-directed component of action
selection and not in either habitual or Pavlovian
control.
Note that ruling out a role for the vmPFC in
Pavlovian mechanisms does not exclude a contri-
bution for this region in using discriminative stim-
uli to elicit goal-state representations as part of
the machinery of the goal-directed system. Unlike
the Pavlovian scenario where stimuli come through
learning to elicit conditioned reflexes, in this case,
discriminative stimuli are used to retrieve infor-
mation pertaining to the goal state, which is then
fed into the system for computing goal-directed ac-
tion values. As described earlier, there is indeed ev-
idence to suggest that the vmPFC contributes to
just such a (non-Pavlovian) stimulus-driven pro-
cess, but equally as we just considered, the vmPFC
can also retrieve goal-value information in the ab-
senceof discriminative stimuli. Thus, discriminative
stimuli are just one of several mechanisms by which
goal-value information can be retrieved.
Multistage process of goal-directed action
selection and the role of the vmPFC
Putting all of this together, we can start to build a
picture of what a neural system for mediating goal-
directed action selection might look like (Fig. 1).
First of all, the system will require a detailed model
of the decision space, which would consist of rep-
resentations of the relevant stimuli and actions,
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Figure 1. Illustration of some of the key component processes involved in goal-directed decisionmaking within the framework of
model-based reinforcement learning. An associativemap of stimuli and actions bound together by transition probabilities, together
with a representation of the outcome stimuli, forms a representation of the “model.” Within this model representation through
learned associations, stimuli or actions can elicit a representation of the associated outcome that in turn retrieves a representation
of the incentive value for that outcome (goal). This is done over all known available outcomes, enabling a relative goal-value signal
to be computed, taking into account the range of possible outcomes. Action contingencies are then calculated for a given outcome
using the forward model machinery, which, when combined with the relative goal-value signal and effort cost, constitute an action
value. This signal is in turn fed into a decision comparator that enables selection of a particular action, which is then fed to the
motor output system as well as enabling the chosen value to be elicited. The vmPFC is suggested to be involved in encoding a
number of these signals (illustrated by the green area), particularly those pertaining to encoding the value of goal outcomes. Yet,
the process of computing action values and ultimately generating a choice is suggested to occur outside of this structure.
the transition probabilities between different states
contingent on particular actions, and the identity of
particular outcomes or goals. At the time of deci-
sionmaking, itwould thenbepossible to retrieve the
identity of different goal outcomes, which in turn
can elicit through incentive learning,44 the hedonic
value of the goal outcome in different motivational
states. We have argued here for a role of the vmPFC
in the retrieval of such goal values at the time of de-
cisionmaking. Second, we have argued for a role for
this area in comparing and contrasting between the
values of different available goals so that a relative
preference ranking is computed over available goals.
Next, the normalized goal values need to be com-
bined with action contingencies and action/effort
costs to compute overall goal-directed action val-
ues. It is argued here that these action value com-
putations may be mediated outside of the vmPFC
in areas such as parts of the parietal cortex, an-
terior dorsal striatum, and supplementary motor
cortex. These action-value signals then must be fed
into a decision comparator to ultimately enable ac-
tion selection.We have not considered in this article
where and how this type of action-value compar-
ison might take place—this issue is discussed in
detail elsewhere,51,52 but in brief there is emerg-
ing evidence for the existence of comparator signals
in a number of areas in the brain including the lat-
eral intraparietal cortex and the dorsomedial frontal
cortex.31,53,54 Once the decision is rendered, it has
been shown that the vmPFC is once again promi-
nently involved in representing the expected value of
the chosen option and the value of the experienced
outcome. The value of the chosen outcome can,
when combined with the experienced outcome sig-
nal, facilitate the computation of reward prediction
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errors, which in turnmight serve a number of func-
tions even within a model-based RL framework
(where reward predictions are not required for value
learning per se).
It is important to note that the framework
proposed here does have strong similarities to
other proposals regarding differential functions of
these areas,55 in which it has been suggested that
parts of the dorsal cortex, including the dorso-
medial prefrontal cortex, are involved in encoding
action-dependent values and decisions over actions,
whereas the vmPFC is instead involved inmediating
choices over stimuli.56 The difference between this
proposal and our proposal is that we suggest that
rather than being part of a separate stimulus-based
choice system, the vmPFC might be better char-
acterized as a contributing node of a goal-directed
system in which this area encodes goal values that
are used to compute overall values for actions that
in turn form an input into the decision process. Al-
though we do suggest that the vmPFC is involved in
a form of comparison over goal values, we suggest
that this comparison is part of the process of ranking
available goals (i.e., to compute a relative value scale)
rather than constituting a decision about which goal
to select per se. On many occasions, the goal ranked
highest will turn out to be the one selected, but un-
der situations where, for example, the most desir-
able goal is also the one requiring themost effort, or
where that goal is associatedwith a lowprobabilityof
attainment given the available action contingencies,
then themost preferred goalwill not be synonymous
with the action–outcome pair ultimately selected.
The proposal advanced here has the advantage of
parsimony (having two independent goal-directed
choice systems would appear to introduce consid-
erable redundancy), but also takes into account the
fact that eventually all choices must be reflected in
the selection of a particular action that ultimately
has to involve cortical areas involved in the control
of movement.
Another alternative perspective is the proposal
that all economic decision making is necessarily
done in “goods” and not action space, and then
once the decision is rendered over goods, the neces-
sary actions are subsequently selected as a secondary
stage.57,58 Yet it is unclear why a decision should be
renderedexclusivelyover goodswithout considering
the specific individual actions and corresponding
unique costs and contingencies at the same time, if
such information is available at the time of decision
making. If I make a choice exclusively in the domain
of goods, I would still need to compute an overall
integrated decision utility whereas at the same time
incorporating an estimate of the contingency and
costs associated with every possible action available
for selecting that good. For instance, in our lunch
example, there’s no point in selecting the Chinese
option, even although it is my most preferred food,
if the only actions available to select that goal in-
volve a treacherous 5-mile walk with a substantial
risk of falling into a pothole on the way. Once I have
selected a “good” in the abstract, I still need to go
back over the contingencies and costs of the avail-
able actions to make a subsequent second decision
over which particular action I’m going to select to
obtain that good. I, thus, would need to perform
computations over actions twice: first when gener-
ating my overall decision utility for the “good” and
in choosing a good, and then subsequently when
choosing an action to select that good. A far more
parsimonious mechanism would be to make a sin-
gle choice over action–goal pairs where each action–
goal pair is linked to an action value integrating over
all costs, benefits, and contingencies associated with
that action–goal pair.
It should be noted that, as discussed earlier in the
context of the Wunderlich et al.21 study, clearly it is
sometimes possible for decisions to be made about
goals without knowing the specific actions avail-
able and hence not knowing about specific action
costs or contingencies. In that case, it is possible that
“proxy” actions are used—for example, “select the
red stimulus” to assign values to different options as
an input into the decision process. However, once
specific actions are known about, then the effort and
contingencies associated with those actions need to
be incorporated into the decision utility computa-
tion and the decision to be rendered is necessarily
one to bemade over action–goal pairs instead of just
over goals.
Conclusions
Here, we reviewed evidence on the functions of
the vmPFC in goal-directed decision making. It has
been argued that this region may contribute in par-
ticular to encoding the value of goals and that the
contribution of this region in goal-value processing
can be contrasted with that of other regions, such
as parts of the parietal cortex, dorsal striatum, and
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supplementary motor cortex, which contribute in-
stead to computing the values of particular actions.
Thus, although the vmPFC can be seen as a key
brain structure involved in encoding the value sig-
nals necessary for goal-directed decision making in
the mammalian brain, it is only through interac-
tions with other brain systems that values assigned
to goal states can be translated into decisions over
actions and ultimately into behavior.
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